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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of the survey is to fill in the initial knowledge gap on Estonian legal entities linked to foreigners. This is important because risk assessments show that Estonia is not threatened by domestic money laundering but primarily by cross-border money laundering, mostly involving persons who are only formally connected to Estonia, e.g., through bank accounts opened here, assets in Estonia or legal persons established here16. The criminal exploitation of Estonian legal persons was highlighted in the latest Estonian National Risk Assessment on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (hereinafter ‘NRA’) as a national vulnerability compared to other areas17. However, the NRAs have so far failed to assess the risks posed by legal persons linked to foreigners, as the relevant basic data of the commercial register has proven to be impenetrable18. While the most recent MONEYVAL evaluation report criticised Estonia for poor risk awareness regarding the misuse of legal persons, one of the risk factors of money laundering and terrorist financing requiring further analysis that was highlighted was the concealment of beneficial ownership of foreigners, i.e., persons not related to the Estonian economy, behind legal persons with complex ownership structures19.
This survey is the first systematic overview of Estonian legal persons with links to foreigners, their most common forms, areas of activity, economic performance, potential complex ownership or control structures and the geographical distribution of related foreign persons by country of origin. Nevertheless, the survey does not constitute a risk assessment: the data sources used allow for a limited assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the results of the survey help to improve the existing knowledge on sectoral vulnerability and thus support the coverage of the issue in the next national risk assessment.
The main results of the extensive data processing and subsequent analysis conducted as part of this study are as follows:
More than a fifth of Estonian legal entities20 are linked to foreign persons
- 22% of Estonian legal persons (approx 78,300 legal entities) are linked to foreign persons: 13% of legal entities are linked to persons from third countries and 10% to persons from European Union (EU) Member States (including 1% linked to persons from both groups). In the case of third countries, the strong links of local legal entities to both Russia and Asian countries stand out.
- The vulnerability of legal entities to cross-border misuse is reduced by the fact that more than a third of foreign-linked legal entities are linked to persons with a valid residence permit or right of residence21. A quarter of these legal entities are linked to EU persons, while around 80% are linked to persons from third countries (with an overlap of around 5%).
- The impact of the e-residency programme on foreigners’ business relations in Estonia remains strong: a third of the legal entities with foreign links (approx 26,100) are linked to persons with a valid e-residency. Approximately half of the legal entities are linked to e-residents who are EU citizens, half to e-residents who are third-country nationals.
- More than half of the legal entities validly linked to foreign persons were established in the last seven years. During this period, the registration of legal entities related to e-residents has increased significantly.
- The large number of Estonian legal entities linked to persons from EU countries demonstrates above all the successful functioning of EU’s border-free internal market, the attractiveness of the Estonian tax environment and the practical usability of e-residency. However, the ‘long-distance relationship’ that EU persons often have with Estonian legal entities can make the latter vulnerable to criminal exploitation.
- In addition, 5% of legal entities are linked to persons of undetermined citizenship22, dominated by active legal entities operating locally in Estonia.
Few signs of the concealment of foreign beneficial owners
- Legal entities linked to foreigners report beneficial owner data to the register better than legal entities with no foreigner connection.
- Foreigners rarely use the multi-layered business structure here23.
- Since the data of both the commercial register and the beneficial owners register is publicly available in Estonia, the risk that beneficial owners who are criminals hide behind complex legal structures is reduced.
- Commercial register’s data indicates the occasional concealment of foreign beneficial owners with the help of company service providers.
- The frequent connections of Estonian legal entities with persons from tax havens24 constitute a red flag in terms of the concealment of beneficial owners: more than 8,000 legal entities are linked to international or offshore financial centres (9% of legal entities with a foreigner link). As many as 35% of legal entities with a foreigner link (32,300) are linked to different low-tax jurisdictions25.
Nearly a third of foreign-linked legal entities have links to persons from high-risk jurisdictions
- Russia clearly dominates among the higher risk countries, with more than 20,300 legal entities linked to its natural and legal persons (26% of foreign-linked legal entities, nearly 6% of all legal entities registered in the commercial register).
- In addition to legal entitiese-resi linked to Russia, there are more than 4,300 legal entities linked to persons from other countries with a higher risk of terrorist financing26 (nearly 6% of foreign-linked legal entities). As many as 2/5 of them are not active in Estonia. A quarter of the legal entities are linked to persons with a valid residence permit and more than half to persons with valid e-residency.
- Around 700 legal entities are linked to persons from other EU countries or countries on the FATF lists of high-risk countries. In total, more than 3,200 legal entities (4% of foreign-linked legal entities) are linked to persons from EU countries or countries on the FATF lists of high-risk countries27. While the role of valid e-residents has significantly declined in this risk group, more than a third of these legal entities, especially those related to high-risk countries in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, are still linked to e-residents.
- Nearly 3,100 legal entities are linked to countries whose co-operation with the EU in tax matters is insufficient28. As in the case of links to countries with a high risk of terrorist financing, Russia has not been included here.
- The registration of legal entities with links to high-risk countries in the commercial register has decreased, which is supported by the control and risk management measures of the e-residency programme29. As the issue of legal entities with links to persons from high-risk third countries is not limited to e-residents, more attention should be paid to the activities of existing legal entities with links to persons from high-risk countries and the management of their risks.
A quarter of foreign-linked legal entities have had no signs of actual economic activity for a long time
- Legal entities with links to foreigners are more likely than the Estonian average to have no employees and a quarter of foreign-linked legal entities have shown no signs of activity from 2020 to 2022 (have not submitted annual reports or VAT returns in Estonia). These are red flags of potential exploitation of legal entities for money laundering or the commission of tax or other crimes.
- The legal entities linked to e-residents from non-EU countries are more vulnerable to criminal exploitation, as they have worse-than-average activity indicators and are more often linked to persons from high-risk jurisdictions and.
- The risk of criminal exploitation of inactive legal entities can be reduced by purging the commercial register of legal entities with no signs of activity30, as only the legal persons entered in the register have passive legal capacity.
There are far more legal entities linked to foreigners in Estonia than could be identified solely on the basis of commercial register data
- To a large extent, the analysed commercial register data needed to be supplemented. Solely on the basis of commercial register data, it would have been possible to link around 53,700 legal persons to foreigners, ie 58% of the legal entities linked to foreigners identified in this analysis.
- Making commercial register data publicly accessible was an important step towards increasing the transparency of legal persons. However, the current data quality of the register does not allow to reach the full potential of open data. The registry card data regarding related persons with the right of representation and shareholders of private limited companies also fails to meet the public prudential requirements imposed on them.
- Incorrect and incomplete data on foreign persons linked to legal entities will have an impact on the assessment of risks in other areas as well, not only on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing: the register data of legal entities serves as an important input for assessing the risks of security (including reliability of foreign investments), migration, sanctions evasion and export restrictions violations. Incomplete register data complicates the work of both competent authorities in the field and obliged persons under the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act and the International Sanctions Act, as a result of which important criminal and security threats may not be identified in time.
- For these reasons, the register data on existing legal entities in the commercial register and the register of beneficial owners should be organised and supplemented and the data entry rules and process should be improved so that accurate and complete data on foreign persons linked to a legal entity can be entered in the register.
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16 This conclusion is also reiterated in the latest FIU Yearbook – Estonian Financial Intelligence Unit Yearbook 2022: p 8. In its foreign relations summaries and yearbooks, the FIU has often highlighted that the financial intelligence units of other countries often send queries to the FIU indicating the criminal exploitation of Estonian-registered legal persons in foreign countries. In its 2021 summary of activities, the FIU stated that nearly a third of foreign queries concerned Estonian legal entities whose bank accounts were located abroad and in the case of which transactions with money laundering characteristics took place outside Estonia. The recent typology notice of the FIU, which was also based on foreign information, addressed the exploitation of Estonian legal entities with VAT numbers in foreign countries.
17 While in all other performance areas assessed in the NRA, the national vulnerability level ranged from 0.33 to 2 on a scale from 0 to 4, then in performance area 5 (misuse of legal persons for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing) the vulnerability level was 2.75, which was slightly higher than the national average vulnerability score 2.73, which also took into account the vulnerability of obliged sectors. – NRA 2020. 4.1. National vulnerabilities: Tables 13 and 14, p 19.
18 The reason given for this in the 2020 NRA was that non-residents associated with a legal entity do not have a unique identifier in the commercial register that would allow legal entities with foreigner link to be distinguished in register data. – See NRA 2020: National vulnerabilities. 4.2. Analysis of the misuse of legal persons: point 4.2.2, p 3.
19 MONEYVAL, 2022. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Estonia. Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report: p 723b lk 192-193.
20 The term ‘legal entity’ has an extended meaning in the report, encompassing all forms of private legal persons (including non-profit associations, foundations and apartment associations in addition to companies) and self-employed persons.
21 The Estonian state has a better overview of the activities of the legal entities linked to foreigners residing in Estonia as well as better intervention possibilities to prevent, deter and detect illegal activities, which reduces the vulnerability of legal entities linked to foreigners with a residence permit or right of residence to the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing.
22 When counting persons of undetermined citizenship as foreigners, more than 26% of all legal entities in the commercial register (more than 93,100) are linked to persons of non-Estonian citizenship.
23 The creation of complex chains of ownership is a key method of concealing beneficial ownership, which is used in both money laundering and tax evasion schemes. The results of this analysis confirmed the results of the EU-wide Datacros project published in 2021, which showed that the ownership structure of Estonian legal entities is predominantly very simple compared to legal entities in other EU countries.
24 Jurisdictions in the OECD’s list „Jurisdictions Committed to Improving Transparency and Establishing Effective Exchange of Information in Tax Matters“.
25 This group includes countries that do not co-operate with the EU on tax matters (see footnote 12), international finance centres and tax havens listed by the OECD (footnote 8), as well as the top 20 countries in the Tax Justice Network’s Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021.
26 List of countries with a higher risk of terrorist financing: Financial Intelligence Unit’s Appendix to the Guidelines on the Characteristics of Suspicious Transactions (updated in September 2023).
27 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Jurisdictions with Strategic AML/CFT deficiencies’; European Commission, ‘High risk third countries and the International context content of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism’.
28 Council of Europe, ‘EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes’, ‘Jurisdictions which cooperate with the EU and have pending commitments’.
29 The Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) conducts a thorough background check on all applicants for an e-resident’s digital ID, also involving other state authorities (eg FIU, Tax and Customs Board, Estonian Internal Security Service). As of March 2022, applicants who are citizens of Russia and Belarus are no longer able to join the e-residency programme. There are also restrictions for residents of high-risk third countries. – PBGB, E-Residency for citizens of Russia and Belarus; ‘Euroopa rahapesuraportis olid tugevad etteheited e-residentsuse programmile’. ERR 27.01.2023; Belkin, M. ‘Punane nimekiri: peagi ei saa suure riskiga riikidest pärit inimesed enam e-residentideks’. Eesti Ekspress 30.05.2023; ‘E-Residency FAQ: Are there any country restrictions or limitations?’.
30 The Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the area, is already working on that. – ‘Ligi 90 000 ettevõtet ähvardab äriregistrist kustutamine’. Postimees, 16.08.2023.
Viimati uuendatud 10.04.2024
Viimati uuendatud 17.04.2024